Interdependence in Multinational Production Networks by Chen, Maggie
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Interdependence in Multinational
Production Networks
Maggie Chen
George Washington University
2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28485/
MPRA Paper No. 28485, posted 31. January 2011 00:16 UTC
Interdependence in Multinational Production Networks
Maggie Xiaoyang Cheny
Department of Economics and Elliott School of International A¤airs
George Washington University
January 2011
Abstract
Most multinational rms today operate multilateral production networks.
Most existing empirical analyses, however, have focused on rmschoice between
producing at home and investing overseas. This paper uses detailed French
multinational subsidiary data to examine the e¤ect of existing production net-
works on multinationalsentry decisions. The paper nds strong horizontal and
vertical interdependence across multinationalsforeign production locations, but
little interdependence between home and foreign production when third-country
e¤ects are taken into account. This result constitutes a sharp contrast to the
conventional emphasis, and highlights the importance of investigating foreign
direct investment in the context of multinational production networks.
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1 Introduction
Most multinational corporations (MNCs) today operate multilateral production networks.
French multinationals, for example, invested in, on average, 3.8 foreign countries in 2007,
an increase of 0.9 country per rm compared to 2005. Yet the vast empirical literature of
multinational rms has largely ignored the multilateral nature of MNC production, focus-
ing instead on the relationship between home-country production and foreign investment.
Most studies in the literature assume that multinational rmsdecisions to invest in for-
eign countries are independent of their existing production networks in third countries, an
assumption increasingly at odds as multinationals expand production around the world.
This paper examines the e¤ect of third-country production networks on multinationals
entry decisions using a rich dataset that provides detailed location, ownership, and pro-
duction information for French manufacturing rmsforeign subsidiaries in 2005 and 2007.
These data are used to identify the structure of individual rms production networks
around the world and the change of the networks over time. They are also used to establish
intra-rm linkages, in particular, the input-output relationships of subsidiariesproduction
activities, thereby making it possible to distinguish the nature of interdependence among
multinationalsforeign subsidiaries.
Figure 1, for example, plots the geographic distribution of Renaults global production
network in 2007. Two observations emerge in this gure. First, Renault owns subsidiaries in
more than 10 countries outside of France. Second, Renault segments production across for-
eign production locations, producing components in countries like Argentina, South Korea,
and Spain (represented by the darker area) and performing end processes in countries like
Russia and Colombia (represented by the lighter area). These observations are not exclusive
to Renault. French multinationals had abroad in 2007, on average, 0.72 intermediate pro-
duction subsidiaries (producing intermediate inputs required for nal-good production) and
2.49 nal-good production subsidiaries (producing nal products). It is clear that multi-
nationalsinvestment decisions can no longer be viewed as a choice between producing at
home and investing abroad, but involve, instead, networks of vertically linked subsidiaries.
[Figure 1 about here]
Econometric evidence in this study suggests strong interdependence in multinationals
foreign production networks. Third-country subsidiaries exert a signicant e¤ect on multi-
nationalsexpansion decisions with respect to both nal-good and intermediate production.
First, MNCs are more likely to locate nal-good production in countries to which it would
be relatively costly to import nal goods from existing foreign subsidiaries. This result, re-
ferred to in the paper as horizontal interdependence, reects MNCsmarket access motive.
Second, multinationals tend to produce nal products in countries that o¤er better access
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to large markets. This nding, labeled as the market potential e¤ect, captures the impor-
tance of host-country market potential. Finally, the paper nds signicant interdependence
between intermediate and nal-good production subsidiaries. Specically, multinationals
tend to locate nal-good production so as to minimize the cost of importing intermedi-
ate inputs from existing intermediate production subsidiaries. Similarly, MNCs are more
likely to select countries with better access to existing nal-good production subsidiaries as
intermediate production locations. This type of interaction, referred to in the paper as ver-
tical interdependence, is shown to increase in the extent of input-output linkages between
subsidiaries.
The strong interdependence between MNCs foreign production locations contrasts
sharply with the little evidence of interdependence between multinationalsproduction at
home and new investments abroad. The estimated relationship between foreign investment
and home-country production becomes insignicant in the paper when third-country net-
work factors are taken into account. This result is robust to the various specications used to
address omitted variable bias and potential endogeneity of network factors. In a departure
from the existing literature, the result suggests that assuming away the interdependence
of foreign production locations is likely to yield biased estimates for the relationship be-
tween home-economy performance and FDI activities, and calls for reconsideration of the
conventional specication to take into account the e¤ect of third-country networks.
Findings in this study also convey important messages to host-country policy makers.
First, given the vertical interdependence between intermediate and nal-good production,
trade policies like lower import tari¤s on intermediate inputs can a¤ect countriesattractive-
ness as nal-good production locations. Second, FDI ows to third countries can mediate a
host countrys ability to attract multinationals. This cross-country spillover can be either
positive or negative depending on the linkages of FDI ows.
This paper is closely related to a growing theoretical literature led by Yeaple (2003a),
Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008) that applies FDI
modeling to a three-country framework. The existing literature on FDI, including the sem-
inal work of Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984), and inuential empirical contributions
by Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003b), Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2004), and Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005), stresses the importance of
market access and comparative advantage in multinationalsincentives to invest abroad.1
Yeaple (2003a), Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), and Bergstrand and Egger (2008)
show that the combination of market-access and comparative-advantage motives can lead
to export-platform FDI whereby multinational rms adopt a host country as a platform
from which to serve third nations. This prediction suggests that multinationalsinvestment
decisions cannot be viewed as a binary choice between exporting from home and investing
1See Blonigen (2005) for an excellent survey of this literature.
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abroad, but rather engages other, third nations.
Most of the empirical literature has not taken into account the third-country e¤ect,
much less the interdependence between multinationalsforeign production locations. The
following few studies took the step of examining the determinants of export-platform FDI.
Head and Mayer (2004) show that third-country market demand plays a signicant role in
countriesability to attract multinational rms. They nd that Japanese multinationals
are more likely to locate in regions proximate to large markets. Baltagi, Egger and Pfaf-
fermayr (2007) consider a broader set of third-country characteristics and nd most of the
characteristics exert a signicant e¤ect on the level of U.S. outbound FDI. Chen (2009)
examines how a host countrys preferential trade agreements with third nations can a¤ect
its receipt of FDI, and nds that countries integrated with large markets tend to experience
an increase in total and export-platform investment.
Blonigen et al. (2007, 2008) were among the rst to investigate cross-country interde-
pendence in FDI. Using sectoral FDI data, Blonigen et al. (2007) examine how investments
in third countries a¤ect a countrys receipt of U.S. FDI. They nd the results to be sensitive
to the sample of host countries: the third-country e¤ect can be either insignicant or of re-
verse signs. Evidence of negative interdependence across proximate host countries, a result
consistent with export-platform FDI theory, is found mainly among European OECD mem-
bers. Further, taking into account third-country FDI does not alter the estimated e¤ects of
traditional FDI determinants. The importance of third-country e¤ects in inbound FDI is
shown in Blonigen et al. (2008). The authors nd a strong parent market proximity e¤ect
whereby parent marketsproximity to large third nations increases the volume of FDI. The
e¤ect of third-country FDI in host countries is negative when the sample is restricted to
European countries.
This paper examines the cross-country interdependence in individual multinationals
production networks using subsidiary-level data. The dataset employed here o¤ers two
distinct advantages relative to the aggregate data used previously in the literature. First,
the dataset makes it possible to distinguish horizontal and vertical linkages for each pair
of subsidiaries at a disaggregate industry level (NACE 4-digit), following the methodology
introduced in Alfaro and Charlton (2009). These linkages cannot be distinguished at the
aggregate industry level considered in previous studies because, as Alfaro and Charlton
(2009) note, a large percentage of vertical FDI is intra-industry. This might explain, to
some extent, the ambiguity of the evidence reported in Blonigen et al. (2007, 2008), whose
estimates likely reect a mix of horizontal and vertical interactions. Second, the subsidiary-
level dataset supports the examination of individual multinational rmsentry decisions,
thereby making it possible to compare the e¤ect of traditional FDI determinants with the
e¤ect of third-country networks. Evidence in the present study shows that the ability to
focus on intra-rm interdependence results in sharply di¤erent ndings from those reported
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in previous studies. Specically, the estimated interdependence between FDI and home-
country production disappears when third-country network variables are included.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines attributes of French
MNC production networks. A simple, three-country theoretical framework to motivate the
empirical analysis is presented in Section 3, and the econometric methodology and data
sources are described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. The main econometric results are
presented in Section 6, the sensitivity analyses in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Attributes of French MNC Production Networks
French multinational rmsproduction networks exhibit a number of notable attributes.
First, consider the distribution of French multinationals by the number of countries in
which investment occurs (Figure 2). In 2007, most French MNCs concentrated foreign pro-
duction in three or more countries, with some spreading to as many as 63. Comparing 2007
with 2005, the average size of production networks increased by 0.93. Second, nal-good
production subsidiaries accounted for a large fraction of French MNCsforeign production
locations.2 The average number of countries in which rms perform nal-good production,
2.49, is signicantly greater than the average number of countries in which rms engage in
intermediate production (0.72).
[Figure 2 about here]
Now consider the geographic density of French MNCsproduction networks. Based on
the distance data obtained for each pair of subsidiaries (owned by the same French MNCs),
the closest two are 66 kilometers apart (located in Austria and Slovakia), the most distant
pair 19,845 kilometers apart (located in Estonia and New Zealand). Most subsidiaries are
within 6,126 kilometers of one another, the mean distance being around 6,000 kilometers.
At the rm level, while a signicant percentage of French MNCs operate relatively dispersed
networks with subsidiaries located distant from one another, many MNCs concentrate their
subsidiaries geographically, clustered in neighboring countries such as EU members.
Comparing the distance of nal-good production locations with that of vertically linked
subsidiaries suggests that the geographic density of production networks varies signicantly
with the input-output linkages between subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with input-output pro-
duction relationships tend to be located closer to each other than subsidiaries that perform
duplicate nal-good production. The average distance between vertically linked subsidiaries
is around 5,159 kilometers, signicantly less than the average distance between nal-good
production subsidiaries.
2Section 4 describes how nal-good and intermediate production subsidiaries are identied for purposes
of the analysis.
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The above observations apply as well to tari¤s, which are obtained for each pair of
subsidiary countries. For more than 30 percent of French MNC subsidiary pairs, the tari¤
rates between their subsidiary countries are zero. For more than 50 percent, the tari¤ rates
are 7 percent or lower. At the rm level, more than 15 percent of French MNCs do not
need to pay tari¤s when exporting from one subsidiary country to another, and 50 percent
face an average of 6 percent or lower tari¤s. This suggests that French MNCschoices of
foreign production locations are not always driven by the tari¤-jumping motive; a large
percentage of French MNCs can trade freely within their production networks.
Tari¤ rates, like distance, tend to be lower between vertically linked subsidiaries than
between nal-good production locations. The average tari¤ rates for French MNCs to
import intermediate inputs to nal-good production subsidiaries are 1.5 percentage points
lower than the 4.5-percent average tari¤ rates between nal-good production subsidiaries.
3 Theoretical Motivation
As a prelude to the econometric analysis, a stylized theoretical framework is adopted in
this section to motivate the empirical hypotheses.
3.1 General setup
Suppose the world consists of N countries N = f1; 2; :::; Ng. In each country, a certain
amount of the representative consumers expenditure, denoted as Ej (j 2 N ), is allocated
to the industry of di¤erentiated products, within which the consumer has a utility function
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES). Maximizing the CES utility function subject
to the consumers expenditure level yields the demand function for each representative
variety: qij = Yjp ij ; where qij denotes the quantity of the di¤erentiated product produced
by rms in country i and sold to destination country j, Yj  Ej=
P
r p
1 
rj denotes the
demand level in country j with r representing the set of varieties, pij denotes the product
price, and   1=(1   ) > 1 the demand elasticity. Note that pij =  ij  pi, where pi is
country is product market price and  ij > 1 is the iceberg trade cost of exporting from
country i to country j (with  ii = 1).
Each rm produces a di¤erent brand of the di¤erentiated product. Given the interest
of the present study, it is assumed that country 1s rms can produce nal goods in any
country and rms in the other countries produce only at home and serve foreign markets
via exports. Firms must pay a plant-level xed cost F for each nal-good production
location and produce one unit of intermediate input for each unit of nal good.3 Country
3Given this papers focus on intra-rm linkages, the option of purchasing intermediate inputs from
una¢ liated suppliers is not explored here. The e¤ect of this option on rmslocation decisions is a promising
area for future empirical research. For theoretical studies in this area see, for example, Krugman and
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1s rms can produce the intermediate input, as they can the nal product, in any country.
For simplicity, the plant-level xed cost for intermediate-input production, denoted by G,
is assumed to be su¢ ciently large that rms choose to perform intermediate production
in only one location.4 Intermediate production subsidiaries are assumed to sell inputs to
nal-good production subsidiaries at mkki, where mk is the marginal cost of producing
intermediate inputs and ki is the cost of exporting intermediate inputs from country k to
country i.
The goal of this model is to examine rmsdecisions to invest in nal-good and interme-
diate production given an existing production network. Let Fini be an indicator variable
that equals 1 if a rm has nal-good production in country i and similarly Inti be an in-
dicator variable that identies the existence of intermediate production in country i. Each
rms production network can then be characterized as g  fFini; Intig where i 2 N . A
rm is dened as a national rm if it has no subsidiary abroad, and a multinational if it
has at least one foreign subsidiary. The set of countries in which a rm performs nal-good
production is denoted by NFin(g) = fi 2 N : Fini = 1g and the set of countries with
intermediate production is represented by NInt(g) = fi 2 N : Inti = 1g. The numbers
of countries in which rms perform nal-good and intermediate production are denoted,
respectively, by nFin(g) and nInt(g).
Maximizing prots yields:
pi =
ci +mkki

; (1)
where ci is the marginal cost of producing the nal good in country i. Given equation (1),
the operating prot a rm will earn by producing the intermediate input in country k and
nal good in country i and selling to destination country j is
ij(g) =  [(ci +mkki)  ij ]
1 Yj (2)
where   (1  ) 1.
It is clear that ij is an increasing function of country js demand (Yj) and a decreasing
function of the nal good marginal cost (ci) and the trade cost to ship the nal good from
country i to country j ( ij). Moreover, ij decreases in the marginal cost of producing
the intermediate input (mk) and the trade cost of shipping the input to the nal-good
production location (ki).
Suppose the rm has chosen NFin(g) as the set of locations in which to produce the
Venables (1996), Venables (1996), and Puga and Venables (1997). The empirical analysis undertaken in
this paper attempts to control for these factors using rm xed e¤ect, as rm-level data that identify
intermediate-input suppliers are largely missing.
4Although roughly in alignment with the observation that French multinationals have, on average, fewer
intermediate production subsidiaries than nal-good production locations, this assumption is not crucial for
purposes of the comparative analysis undertaken in the paper.
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nal good and country k as the location in which to produce the intermediate input, that
is, NInt(g) = fkg. The total prot function will then be given by:
(g) =
X
i2NFin(g)
 (ci +mkki)
1  Yi (3)
+
X
j2NnNFin(g)

max
i2NFin(g)
 [(ci +mkki)  ij ]
1 Yj

  nFin(g)F  G:
In this equation, the rst term represents the operating prot from domestic sales (in
countries with nal-good production), the second term represents the operating prot from
export sales (in countries without nal-good production), and the last two the xed costs of
nal-good and intermediate production (which increase as rms increase the number of pro-
duction locations). Note that export prot depends on the choice of export-platform coun-
tries, that is, the nal-good production locations in NFin(g) from which the rm chooses
to export to each market. Firms will strictly prefer location conguration g to g if and
only if
(g) > (g) : (4)
3.2 Final-good production location decision
Given the goal of examining rms investment decisions in a given production network,
suppose the current production network consists of a nal-good production subsidiary in
country ei and an intermediate production subsidiary in country ek, that is, g0 = fFinei =
1; Intek = 1g.
First, consider the decision to establish a new nal-good production subsidiary in coun-
try i, denoted by Fini. If Fini = 1, the production network will change from g0 to
g1 = fFini = Finei = 1; Intek = 1g. Firms will establish a nal-good production subsidiary
in i if and only if
(g1) > (g0) : (5)
Given equation (3), the above condition implies5
(ci +mekeki)1 Mi > (cei +mekekei)1 (eii1 Yi +M eei ) + F; (6)
whereMi  Yi+M ei  Yi+
P
j2NnNFin(g1)( ij
1 Yj) represents country is market potential,
which includes country is domestic market size Yi and the (trade-cost weighted) aggregate
size of third-country export markets, denoted by M ei , in which the rm does not have
5To simplify the theoretical analysis, rms are assumed to adopt the new nal-good production subsidiary
in country i as the export platform to serve third countries.
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nal-good production. Letting eki  mek=ci denote the extent of vertical linkage between
intermediate input and nal good, the above expression can be re-written as:
c1 i (1 + ekieki)1 Mi > (cei +mekekei)1 (eii1 Yi +M eei ) + F: (7)
As monotonic transformations and terms such as cei, mek, ekei, M eei and F do not a¤ect
the ordering of host countries i, condition (7) can be simplied (and taken natural logs) to
obtain the following empirical specication:
Pr [Fini = 1jg0] = [1 ln ci+2 lnYi+v ln(1 + ekieki)| {z }
vertical
+m lnMi| {z }
market potential
+h ln eii| {z }
horizontal
+"]: (8)
In this specication, Pr [Fini = 1jg0] represents the probability of a rm establishing a
new nal-good production location in country i given the rms existing production network
g0 and [:] is the cumulative probability function. The terms ln(1 + ekieki) and ln eii
represent, respectively, the trade costs to import from the rms existing intermediate and
nal-good production locations, and capture the vertical and horizontal interdependence
in the network. The variable lnMi represents country is market potential given the rms
nal-good production network. The residual " captures all the remaining factors such as cei,
mek, ekei, andM eei , attributes of existing production locations that are invariant with country
is attributes.
The e¤ect of existing production networks is expected to vary with the nature of sub-
sidiaries. The e¤ect of vertically linked subsidiaries is expected to satisfy v < 0, that is,
rms have a greater incentive to establish nal-good production subsidiaries in countries
with lower costs of importing intermediate inputs, especially when there is a strong verti-
cal linkage between intermediate inputs and nal goods (i.e., a large eki). The expected
e¤ect of existing nal-good production networks is h > 0, that is, rms are more likely
to expand horizontally in countries with higher costs of importing nal goods. Finally, the
host-country market potential is predicted to have a positive e¤ect, that is, m > 0.
3.3 Intermediate production location decision
Now consider the intermediate production location decision. Given network g0 (where
Finei = 1; Intek = 1), rms will establish an intermediate production subsidiary in country
i and move to network g2 = fFinei = 1; Inti = 1g if and only if
(g2) > (g0) : (9)
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Given equation (3), this is equivalent to
mekekei > mi iei: (10)
Taking natural logs of the above condition yields the following empirical specication:
Pr [Inti = 1jg0] = [1 lnmi + v ln  iei| {z }
vertical
+ h ln ekei| {z }
horizontal
+ "]: (11)
In this expression, Pr [Inti = 1jg0] denotes the probability of a rm establishing an in-
termediate production location in country i given its existing production network g0. The
model predicts v < 0 (incentives to produce intermediate inputs are greater in countries
with lower costs of exporting to rmsexisting nal-good production locations, i.e., a lower
 iei), and h > 0 (rms are more likely to invest in intermediate production when existing
intermediate production subsidiaries have relatively high costs of exporting to nal-good
production locations).6 The residual " captures remaining factors such as mek.
4 Econometric Framework and Methodology
Based on the theoretical section, an econometric framework that examines rms invest-
ment decisions as a function of existing production networks is employed for the empirical
analysis.
4.1 Econometric framework
4.1.1 Final-good production location decision
The decision of individual rms to invest in nal-good production is examined using a
specication built on equation (8):
Pr [Fini = 1] = [XFin;i + (12)
HorizontalFin;i + V erticalFin;i +MarketPotentialFin;i + "Fin;i
where
HorizontalFin = (h0 + h1WDistFin+ h2WTariffFin) IFin
V erticalFin = (v0 + v1WDistInt+ v2WTariffInt) IInt (13)
MarketPotentialFin = m1 lnMDist + m2 lnMTariff :
6Note that since ln ekei is an attribute of rms existing production networks that does not vary with
prospective host country i, it would be controlled for when rm xed e¤ect is included in the estimations.
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In the above equation, Fini represents a rms decision to establish a new nal-
good production subsidiary in country i in 2007, and XFin;i represents a vector of country
is characteristics in 2005 including, for example, domestic market size Yi and marginal
production costs ci.
In addition to host-country characteristics, the right-hand side of equation (12) includes
three terms that capture the structure of rmsexisting production networks in 2005. The
rst term, HorizontalFin, measures horizontal interdependence between nal-good produc-
tion locations. In this term, Fin  fFin1; :::; F inei; :::; F inNg0 is a vector that identies the
existence of nal-good production in each country in 2005 and IFin is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if Fin 6= 0 and 0 otherwise. Two types of trade costs, including transport
costs (proxied by distance) and tari¤s, are taken into consideration in constructing the net-
work term. Specically,WDist is a weighting matrix composed of the distance between each
pair of countries, i.e., flnDist1i, :::, lnDisteii, :::,lnDistNig for each country i; WTariff is
a weighting matrix consisting of the tari¤ rates of importing nal goods, i.e., flnTariff1i,
:::,lnTariffeii, :::, lnTariffNig for each i. To measure the average trade costs between
nal-good production locations, the vector Fin is scaled by each rms total number of
nal-good production locations, that is, nFin. Section 3.2 predicts that h0 < 0, h1 > 0
and h2 > 0, that is, the probability of rms investing in nal-good production in a given
country increases in that countrys costs of importing nal goods from rmsexisting nal-
good production locations.
The second network term in equation (12), i.e., V erticalFin, captures vertical interde-
pendence between intermediate and nal-good production. In this term, Int  fInt1, :::,
Intek; :::, IntNg0 is a vector that identies the existence of intermediate production in each
country in 2005 and IInt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Int 6= 0 and 0 otherwise.
As in the rst network term, WDist is a distance weighting matrix and WTariff is a tari¤
weighting matrix composed of, in this case, the tari¤ rates of importing intermediate in-
puts. Following equation (8), WDist (and similarly WTariff ) can be alternatively dened
as, for each country i, fln(1+1iDist1i), :::,ln(1+ekiDisteki), :::, ln(1+NiDistNi)g to take
into account the extent of vertical production linkages between intermediate and nal-good
production. Again, the vector Int is scaled by each rms total number of intermediate
production locations, that is, nInt, to obtain average trade costs. Section 3.2 predicts that
v0 > 0, v1 < 0 and v2 < 0, that is, the probability of rms investing in nal-good
production in a given country decreases in that countrys costs of importing intermediate
inputs from those rmsexisting intermediate production locations.
Finally, equation (12) takes into account each host countrys market potential. Specif-
ically, MDist = WY=Dist(1   Fin) and MTariff = WY=Tariff (1   Fin), where 1   Fin 
f1   Fin1; :::,1   Finei; :::,1   FinNg0 is a vector that identies all the countries in which
rms do not already have nal-good production, WY=Dist and WY=Tariff are two matrices
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formed by countriesmarket size weighted by, respectively, the distance and the tari¤s of
importing nal goods from a given country i, i.e., fY1=Disti1; :::,Yj=Distiei; :::,YN=DistiNg
and fY1=Tariffi1, :::,Yj=Tariffiei, :::,YN=TariffiNg. The e¤ect of market potential is
expected to be positive, that is, m1 > 0 and m2 > 0.
4.1.2 Intermediate production location decision
Now consider the decision of each rm to invest in intermediate production. The following
specication is adopted based on equation (11):
Pr [Inti = 1] = [XInt;i + V erticalInt;i +HorizontalInt;i + "Int;i] (14)
where
V erticalInt = (v0 + v1WDistFin+ v2WTariffFin) IFin (15)
HorizontalInt =

h0 + h1(WDistFin)
0Int+ h2(WTariffFin)0Int

IInt
In the above equation, Inti represents each rms decision to establish an intermediate
production subsidiary in country i in 2007, and XInt;i represents a vector of country is
characteristics in 2005.
In addition to host-country characteristics, the right-hand side of equation (14) in-
cludes two network terms measured in 2005. The rst network term in equation (14), i.e.,
V erticalInt, captures vertical interdependence between intermediate and nal-good pro-
duction locations. As in Section 4.1.1, WDist is a distance weighting matrix and WTariff
is a tari¤ weighting matrix consisting of, in this case, the tari¤s of exporting intermediate
inputs from each country i. WDistFin and WTariffFin are vectors that represent, respec-
tively, the distance and the tari¤s of exporting intermediate inputs from each host country
to rmsexisting nal-good production locations. Section 3 predicts that v0 > 0, v1 < 0
and v2 < 0, that is, the probability of rms investing in intermediate production in a given
country decreases in that countrys costs of exporting intermediate inputs to those rms
existing nal-good production subsidiaries.
The second network term in equation (14), i.e., HorizontalInt, captures the substituting
relationship between existing and potential intermediate production locations. (WDistFin)0Int
and (WTariffFin)0Int represent, respectively, the distance and the tari¤s of exporting inter-
mediate inputs from rmsexisting intermediate production locations to existing nal-good
production locations. It is expected that h0 < 0, h1 > 0 and h2 > 0, that is, rms are
more likely to invest in intermediate production when existing intermediate production
subsidiaries require a relatively large cost to reach nal-good production locations.
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4.2 Econometric methodology
Given the binary nature of the dependent variables, a probit model is used as a baseline
specication for estimating equations (12) and (13). Three econometric issues can arise in
the empirical analysis including (i) omitted variables, (ii) prevalence of zeros in the values
of dependent variables, and (iii) endogeneity of network variables. To address these issues,
a number of alternative estimating strategies are employed, as discussed below.
Omitted variables First, it is possible that, in addition to rm network variables, other
rm-level characteristics, such as productivity and business connections, also a¤ect rms
entry decisions. A rm-level xed e¤ect can be included in the baseline specication for
equations (12) and (13) to control for the e¤ect of rm attributes.7 To avoid the potential
incidental parameter problem associated with xed-e¤ect probit models, alternative esti-
mators like xed-e¤ect linear probability and conditional logit models were also considered
as a robustness check.
Prevalence of zeros A second issue concerns the prevalence of zeros in the values of
dependent variables. This is determined by the nature of location entry data. Because,
over a given period of time, a multinational rm may make no new entry, choosing instead
to operate with existing production networks, the dependent variables can consist of a large
fraction of zeros relative to the number of observations.
To address this issue, a Heckman selection procedure is considered. In this procedure,
multinationalsdecision of whether to enter any new host country given their existing pro-
duction networks is rst examined. A number of instrumental variables are used in this step
including the number of existing nal-good and intermediate production locations and rm
productivity growth. The choice of these instrumental variables, in particular, productivity
growth, is motivated by an emerging literature, led by Helpman et al. (2004) and Yeaple
(2009), that links rm productivity to the decision to invest abroad. This literature shows
that rms with greater productivity are more likely to overcome the xed cost of FDI in
each host country and invest in larger numbers of countries. In a dynamic setting, rms
that experienced productivity growth should be more likely to expand foreign production
networks and enter new host countries. Controlling for the potential self-selection bias,
rmsdecisions regarding where to invest in nal-good and intermediate production are
then examined, following equations (12) and (14).
Endogeneity of network variables Another issue that can arise in the analysis is the
potential endogeneity of network variables. Even though a time lag is included between
7Note that the adoption of rm xed e¤ects in probit models means that all multinationals that did not
make any entry, that is, rms for which Fini or Inti equals 0 for all i, will be dropped from the analysis.
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rms entry decisions and network characteristics, the network variables can still be en-
dogenous when, for example, rms are su¢ ciently forward looking.
An instrumental variable (IV) approach is employed to address this issue. Consider rst
the nal-good production location decision. In the rst stage, each weighted network vari-
able in equation (12), including WDistFin, WTariffFin, WDistInt, WTariffInt, lnMDist,
and lnMTariff , is estimated using country is characteristics Xi and a vector of instrumen-
tal variables formed by corresponding weighting matrices and the matrix of host-country
characteristics X. For example, the variable WDistFin is estimated using Xi and a vector
of instrumental variables WDistX. The tted values of WDistFin obtained from this stage
are then taken into account in equation (12).
Similarly, for the intermediate production location decision, each weighted network
variable in equation (14) is estimated in the rst stage using Xi and vectors of instrumental
variables, i.e., WDistFin and WTariffFin. The tted values of the network variables are
then taken into account in equation (14) to estimate the e¤ects of existing production
networks.
5 Data
The dataset employed in this paper, obtained from BvDEP AMADEUS, contains compre-
hensive nancial and subsidiary information for public and private French rms. AMADEUS
combines data from specialist regional information providers around the world, with a par-
ticularly good coverage for countries like France.
The dataset reports French multinationalssubsidiary activities in 99 host countries in
2005 and 2007.8 It is compiled using two editions of AMADEUS published in 2006 and
2008, respectively.9 For each multinational rm, the dataset reports not only subsidiary
locations but also, for each location, the primary product, sales, asset, and employment
information.10 There are in total 1,698 French multinational rms in the dataset. These
rms invested in, on average, 2.88 host countries in 2005 and 3.81 countries in 2007.11
Subsidiaries engaged in nal-good and intermediate production are distinguished in the
analysis using the methodology introduced by Alfaro and Charlton (2009). Final-good pro-
duction subsidiaries are identied by comparing each subsidiarys primary product with the
parent rms primary and secondary products, all reported at the NACE 4-digit level.12
If its primary product is listed as one of the parent rms nal products, the subsidiary
8The nal sample is smaller in some specications because of the missing values of explanatory variables.
9AMADEUS does not directly report time series information for subsidiary data. To obtain that infor-
mation, it is necessary to acquire di¤erent editions of AMADEUS published in di¤erent years.
10The coverage of sales, assets, and employment data is not as complete as the location information.
11 It is worth noting that there are very few exits (i.e., subsidiary shut-downs) in the data. Nearly all
subsidiaries that existed in 2005 were active in 2007.
12AMADEUS reports both primary and secondary products of parent rms.
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is considered a nal-good production location. Subsidiaries that engage in intermediate
production are determined by examining the input-output relationship between the sub-
sidiarys primary product and parent rms nal products. A subsidiary is considered
an intermediate production location if the direct requirement for the subsidiarys primary
product in the parent rms nal-product production exceeds a threshold value.13 This
identication of nal-good and intermediate production subsidiaries has been generally ab-
sent in the literature, with the exception of Alfaro and Charlton (2009), mainly because of
lack of information on subsidiary-level activities.
In 2007, according to the above denitions, French multinationals owned, on aver-
age, nal-good production subsidiaries in 2.49 countries and intermediate production sub-
sidiaries in 0.72.14 More than 75 percent of subsidiaries newly established between 2005
and 2007 were nal-good production locations, suggesting a greater tendency for MNCs to
expand horizontally than vertically.
As explained in Section 4.1, the two measures of trade costs used to construct the
network variables are (i) the distance between each pair of host countries (as a proxy for
transport costs), and (ii) the tari¤ rates on parent rmsnal products and intermediate
inputs produced overseas between each pair of host countries. The input-output coe¢ cient
between the primary products of the parent rm and each subsidiary is also included.
Distance data are taken from the CEPII distance database. Tari¤ data, consisting of
applied tari¤ rates at the NACE 4-digit industry level, are obtained from TRAINS. The
input-output coe¢ cients are computed based on the 2002 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) benchmark input-output accounts, a source with more disaggregated information
than most alternative national input-output tables.
In addition to rm network characteristics, FDI determinants traditionally emphasized
in the literature are also taken into account. First, several variables are used to capture
the trade costs between home and host countries. For the nal-good production, multi-
nationals incentives to invest in a foreign country are expected to increase in the trade
costs of exporting nal goods from home. This is the conventional market access motive
of horizontal FDI shown in Markusen (1984) and following empirical studies by Carr et
al. (2001), Brainard (1997), and Yeaple (2003b), and predicts a positive parameter for
transport costs, proxied by distance, between home and host countries and host-country
tari¤s on the home country in the nal-good industry. Multinationalsincentives to invest
in nal-good production in a given country are also expected to decrease in the trade costs
of exporting nal goods back home. This follows directly the theory of vertical FDI es-
13Using di¤erent threshold values yielded similar results. The results presented in the following sections
are obtained based on the threshold value 0.1. The analysis also considered weighting each intermediate
production subsidiary with its input-output coe¢ cient to the nal product, as explained in Section 6.
14Fewer than 20 percent of subsidiaries belong to neither category, and engage in activities such as
wholesale distribution services. They were not included in the construction of network variables.
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tablished by Helpman (1984) and predicts a negative parameter for the distance between
home and host countries and home-country tari¤s on rmsnal goods produced overseas.
A dummy variable that distinguishes EU members from the rest of the world is included
to capture additional trade cost di¤erences between EU and non-EU host countries. Like
distance, the e¤ect of the EU dummy hinges on the type of FDI undertaken by French
MNCs. Finally, multinationals incentives to invest intermediate production in a foreign
country are expected to decrease in the trade costs of exporting intermediate inputs to
nal-good production locations, which are controlled for by the network variables.15
Host-country domestic market size, measured by real GDP, is included as well. Previous
empirical studies, such as Carr et al. (2001), Brainard (1997), and Yeaple (2003b), show that
multinationals tend to invest in countries with a larger domestic market size. Host countries
marginal costs of production, measured in the analysis using real unit labor costs computed
with labor cost and output data from the World Bank Trade and Production Database, are
expected to exert a negative e¤ect on multinationalsinvestment incentives. Finally, as in
Yeaple (2003b), various measures of investment costs are taken into account. First, host
countriestax policy is controlled for using maximum corporate tax rates available from the
U.S. O¢ ce of Tax Policy Research.16 Second, the costs of starting a business, taken from the
World Development Indicators, are included as a proxy for entry costs. Third, the distance
between France and each host country serves as a proxy for xed costs of investment, the
expectation being that the xed cost of investment (for example, monitoring cost) will
be greater for subsidiaries located in remote countries. Table A.1 provides sources and
summary statistics for the variables.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section, the econometric framework outlined in Section 4 is evaluated to establish
the e¤ects of MNC production networks. Multinationals entry decisions are estimated
by rst assuming away the interdependence in production networks. The results are then
compared to the estimates that take into account production network e¤ects. This com-
parison helps to assess the role of existing production networks in MNCsentry decisions
and, further, how accounting for third-country production networks a¤ects the estimated
e¤ects of conventional host-country characteristics.
15Di¤erent from the case of nal-good production, the market access motive, captured by the trade costs
of exporting intermediate inputs from home to host countries, is not expected to play a signicant role in
the decision to invest in intermediate production.
16 Ideally, applied corporate tax rates should be included instead of the maximum, but the former data
have a large number of missing values.
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6.1 Excluding network e¤ects
Table 1 reports estimates of equation (12) excluding the network variables. The estimated
e¤ects of host-country characteristics are largely consistent with the existing literature
for all empirical specications. Consider rst the baseline results reported in column (1).
French MNCs exhibit a signicant market-access motive that is in alignment with previous
ndings. Firms are more likely to establish nal-good production in countries with higher
GDP. They also have greater incentives to enter countries that set higher tari¤s on nal-
product exports from France. The parameter of EU membership is negative, suggesting
that rms are more likely to choose FDI instead of exports in countries outside the EU.
All of these results suggest a horizontal interdependence between MNCshome and foreign
production: MNCs are motivated to replace nal-good exports from home with FDI when
foreign markets are large and trade costs high. As found in previous studies, the e¤ect of
distance is negative, consistent with the role of distance in raising xed costs of investment.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 also implies a signicant comparative advantage motive for French MNCs. Multi-
nationals looking to establish nal-good production subsidiaries are attracted to countries
with a lower unit labor cost. Investment costs also exert a signicant e¤ect on the entry
decision. A higher cost of starting a business is associated with a lower probability of at-
tracting multinational rms. The sign of the corporate tax parameter is inconsistent with
the expectation. This can be a result of the tax data used here, which report each host
countrys maximum corporate tax rate and do not necessarily capture the rates applied
to multinational rms. Because the latter information is not systematically available, to
include it would reduce the sample size substantially.17
The estimated e¤ects of host-country characteristics remain similar when rm dummies
are included in column (2) to control for potential omitted variables. The parameter of
home-country tari¤s also becomes signicant, suggesting a negative relationship between
French nal-good tari¤s and multinationalsincentives to produce the nal good abroad.
This result lends further support to the comparative advantage motive hypothesis: some
French multinationals serve their home country from foreign production locations and are
adversely a¤ected by home-country tari¤s. The Heckman selection procedure adopted to
address the prevalence of zeros in the dependent variables yields similar results.
Table 2 reports estimates of equation (14), excluding the network variables, for MNCs
intermediate production location decisions. As shown in the table, the estimated e¤ects
17The e¤ect of host-country tax rates on multinationalslocation decisions is also dependent on type of
taxes, measurement of FDI activity, and tax treatment in the host and parent countries. For multinationals
that operate multilateral subsidiary networks with vertical production linkages, the possibility of internal
transfer pricing can bring further ambiguity to the e¤ect of individual host countriestax rates.
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of host-country characteristics are largely similar to those reported in Table 1. Countries
with a higher GDP have a greater probability of attracting multinationals. Countries
relatively proximate to France are also more likely to become intermediate production
locations. A higher real unit labor cost or higher entry cost lowers multinationalsincentives
to establish intermediate production subsidiaries in a given country. As expected, host-
country tari¤s do not play a signicant role in intermediate production location decisions.
A result not expected analytically is the positive e¤ect of French tari¤s. Home-country
tari¤s are found to be positively associated with the probability of French rms investing
in intermediate production overseas. Again, controlling for unobserved rm attributes and
prevalence of zeros in the dependent variable does not change the estimated e¤ects of host-
country characteristics.
[Table 2 about here]
6.2 Accounting for network e¤ects
6.2.1 Final-good production location decision
The e¤ects of existing production networks are considered next. Table 3 reports estimates of
equation (12), for the nal-good production location decisions, taking into account potential
network e¤ects. The results provide strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interdepen-
dence in multinationalsproduction networks. First, multinationals are signicantly more
likely to invest in countries relatively distant from existing nal-good production locations.
According to column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in third-country distance in-
creases the probability of entry by 0.1 standard deviation.18 This result applies as well
to tari¤s. The incentive to enter a host country increases in the level of tari¤s on nal-
good imports from existing production locations. Market potential also plays a signicant
role. Multinationals have a greater probability of producing nal goods in countries with
greater market potential. This points to the signicance of export-platform FDI, whereby
multinationals use host countries as the platform from which to supply third countries, in
particular, third countries in which the MNCs do not already have nal-good production
activities.
[Table 3 about here]
The e¤ect of trade costs is reversed when there is a vertical production linkage be-
tween foreign production locations. Table 3 considers the average trade costs of importing
intermediate inputs from existing intermediate production locations, unweighted by input-
output coe¢ cients. The results suggest that French multinationals are motivated to cluster
18To get a sense of the economic signicance of the estimated network e¤ects, standardized coe¢ cients
are computed and reported here.
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vertically linked subsidiaries in proximate countries. For example, according to column
(1), the probability of being selected as a nal-good production location is 0.14 standard
deviation higher for countries one-standard-deviation closer to multinationalsexisting in-
termediate production locations. This result suggests that FDI activities in neighboring
countries and vertically linked intermediate industries can trigger an increase in the ow of
FDI to a host country in the nal good industry.
These ndings remain robust to the adoption of rm dummies and the Heckman proce-
dure in columns (2) and (3), respectively.19 Addressing the endogeneity of network variables
also does not change the results qualitatively. As shown in column (4), most network vari-
ables continue to exert a signicant e¤ect on French MNCsentry decisions.
The e¤ect of the conventional market access variables is a¤ected, however, by the con-
sideration of production networks. As seen in Table 3, the parameters of both host-country
tari¤s on France and French tari¤s on host countries become statistically insignicant when
the network variables are taken into account. This constitutes a sharp contrast with Table
1, in which the evidence suggests signicant interdependence and, in particular, a substi-
tuting relationship between foreign and home-country nal-good production. This change
in the results suggests that it is not adequate to focus exclusively on the interdependence
between home and host countries. Interdependence across foreign production locations in-
creases as multinationalsproduction networks expand over time. The FDI decision is no
longer a binary choice between investing in a foreign country and exporting from home;
it has become signicantly more complex, involving third nations. Ignoring third-country
network e¤ects is likely to give rise to biased estimates for the relationship between home-
country production and FDI activities and, more generally, the true causes and e¤ects of
FDI.
In Table 4, the extent of vertical production linkages is taken into account in construct-
ing the intermediate production network variables, following the description in Section
4.1.1. The results are largely similar to those reported in Table 3. The incentive to cluster
vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with lower trade costs increases in the extent of
vertical linkages. Intermediate production locations with a stronger input-output linkage
to rmsnal-good production play a more important role in the choice of nal-good pro-
duction locations. Again, these results are not sensitive to the various estimation strategies
employed in the analysis.
[Table 4 about here]
19Note that when the rm xed e¤ect is included, the rm-specic network dummy variables drop out of
the estimations.
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6.2.2 Intermediate production location decision
The e¤ects of production networks on MNCsintermediate production location decisions
are examined in this sub-section. Table 5 reports estimates of equation (14), taking into
account production network e¤ects. The results indicate signicant vertical interdepen-
dence between nal-good and intermediate production locations. French multinationals
tend to establish intermediate production locations in countries relatively proximate to ex-
isting nal-good production locations. According to columns (3) and (4), a one-standard-
deviation decrease in distance to MNCsnal production subsidiaries increases the proba-
bility of MNCs investing in intermediate production by 0.15 standard deviation. The e¤ect
of intermediate-input tari¤s is weaker and signicant only in columns (1) and (4).
There is also a substituting e¤ect between existing and potential intermediate produc-
tion locations. The probability of investing in new intermediate production subsidiaries
increases in the trade costs for existing subsidiaries to reach nal-good production loca-
tions. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in the distance between MNCs
existing intermediate and nal production subsidiaries increases the probability of MNCs
establishing new intermediate production locations by 0.16 standard deviation according
to column (3).20 This result is not robust, however, to the adoption of the IV approach.
[Table 5 about here]
7 Conclusion
This study is one of the rst attempts to estimate interdependence in multinationalsglobal
production networks. Using a detailed French multinational subsidiary dataset, the paper
nds, for the rst time, strong evidence of horizontal and vertical interactions between
MNCs foreign production locations. These results complement existing contributions in
which evidence of interdependence, obtained using aggregate FDI data, has been mixed.
Here, third-country subsidiaries are shown to exert a signicant e¤ect on French multina-
tionalsentry decisions with respect to both nal-good and intermediate production. But
the e¤ect varies systematically with the nature of production linkages between subsidiaries.
Multinationals are more likely to expand horizontally when the trade cost of importing
nal goods from existing nal-good production subsidiaries is relatively high, but tend to
locate vertically linked subsidiaries in countries with low intra-rm trade costs, especially
when there is a strong input-output relationship. These results are robust to the control of
omitted variables, prevalence of zeros in the values of dependent variables, and potential
endogeneity of network variables.
20Because these variables only vary across rms, they are controlled for in column (2) by rm dummies.
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Strikingly, there is little evidence of interdependence between multinationalsproduc-
tion at home and new investment abroad when third-country network e¤ects are taken
into account. The estimated e¤ects of conventional market access variables measuring the
trade costs between home and host countries become insignicant after the consideration
of production networks. This sharp contrast with the existing literature can be explained
by the assumption made in most previous studies that rmsdecisions to invest in foreign
countries are independent of their locations in third nations, even though the majority of
multinationals today operate multilateral production networks.
This paper conveys important policy implications for both FDI home and host countries.
It is crucial to analyze the causes and e¤ects of FDI in the context of global production
networks. As shown in the paper, assuming away the interdependence of foreign production
locations is likely to over-estimate the relationship between home-country production and
foreign investments and, further, fail to account for spillovers among FDI ows including,
for example, the e¤ect of FDI inows to third countries on a host countrys ability to attract
multinational rms.
This paper is a step towards examining interdependence in multinational production net-
works, but more research is needed in this area. For example, future work might investigate
the heterogeneity of multinationalsproduction networks and role of rm characteristics,
such as productivity and production technologies, in explaining network attributes. This
type of analysis will provide additional insights into the global organization of rms.
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Table 1: Estimating nal-good production location decisions without network factors
Dependent variable: Expected (1) (2) (3)
Final-good production sign Baseline Firm FE Heckman
location decision selection
Host-country GDP + 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Host-country product tari¤ + 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU membership +/- -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Distance to home +/- -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Real unit labor cost - -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.05***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Home-country product tari¤ - -0.001 -0.003** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Corporate tax - 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Entry cost - -0.003*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No. of observations 102,162 59,950 59,950
Log likelihood -4880.5 -3384.1 -4034.9
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported in the table. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level are included in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for a detailed
description of the variables.
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Table 2: Estimating intermediate production location decisions without network fac-
tors
Dependent variable: Expected (1) (2) (3)
Intermediate production sign Baseline Firm FE Heckman
location decision selection
Host-country GDP + 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Host-country product tari¤ -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
EU membership +/- -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Distance to home +/- -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003)
Real unit labor cost - -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.09***
(0.006) (0.02) (0.03)
Home-country product tari¤ - 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Corporate tax - 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.08***
(0.003) (0.01) (0.02)
Entry cost - -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
No. of observations 102,162 26,370 26,370
Log likelihood -1735.5 -844.1 -981.5
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported in the table. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level are included in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for a detailed
description of the variables.
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Table 3: Estimating nal-good production location decisions with network factors
Dependent variable: Expected (1) (2) (3) (4)
Final-good production sign Baseline Firm FE Heckman IV
location decision selection
Horizontal network dummy - -0.01*** - -0.07*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.01) (0.01)
(a) distance weighted + 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.01***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.01) (0.001)
(b) tari¤ weighted + 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.01*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Vertical network dummy + 0.08*** - 0.35*** 0.01***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.004)
(a) distance weighted - -0.004*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.001***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
(b) tari¤ weighted - -0.006*** -0.003 -0.03** 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.001)
Market potential
(a) distance weighted + 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.06*** -0.01
(0.001) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
(b) tari¤ weighted + 0.002** 0.09*** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.001) (0.02) (0.005) (0.006)
Host-country GDP + 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Host-country product tari¤ + -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
EU membership +/- -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.03***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.01)
Distance to home +/- -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.02***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
Real unit labor cost - -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
Home-country product tari¤ - 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Corporate tax - 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.03
(0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02)
Entry cost - -0.002*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005)
No. of observations 102,162 59,950 59,950 59,950
Log likelihood -3963.2 -2581.5 -3170.3 -3805.2
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported in the table. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level are included in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for a detailed
description of the variables.
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Table 4: Estimating nal-good production location decisions with network factors -
IO weighted
Dependent variable: Expected (1) (2) (3) (4)
Final-good production sign Baseline Firm FE Heckman IV
location decision selection
Horizontal network dummy - -0.01*** - -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.000) (0.01) (0.01)
(a) distance weighted + 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.01) (0.001)
(b) tari¤ weighted + 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.01*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Vertical network dummy + 0.004*** - 0.03*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
(a) distance and IO-coef. weighted - -0.006*** -0.76*** -0.02** -0.01***
(0.002) (0.16) (0.01) (0.005)
(b) tari¤ and IO-coef. weighted - -0.02*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.01*
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.007)
Market potential
(a) distance weighted + 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.01
(0.001) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
(b) tari¤ weighted + 0.002** 0.10*** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.001) (0.02) (0.004) (0.007)
Host-country GDP + 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Host-country product tari¤ + -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
EU membership +/- -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.01)
Distance to home +/- -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.02***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.01) (0.01)
Real unit labor cost - -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01)
Home-country product tari¤ - 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Corporate tax - 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03
(0.003) (0.004) (0.01) (0.02)
Entry cost - -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.01*** -0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005)
No. of observations 102,162 59,950 59,950 59,950
R square -4085.0 -2614.5 -3282.7 -3807.2
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported in the table. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level are included in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for a detailed
description of the variables.
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Table 5: Estimating intermediate production location decisions with network factors
Dependent variable: Expected (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intermediate production sign Baseline Firm FE Heckman IV
location decision selection
Horizontal network dummy - -0.004*** -0.03*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.01) (0.005)
(a) distance weighted + 0.003*** 0.01*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
(b) tari¤ weighted + 0.007*** 0.003 0.003*
(0.002) (0.01) (0.002)
Vertical network dummy + -0.000 0.01*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
(a) distance weighted - -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
(b) tari¤ weighted - -0.002* 0.000 0.01 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.01) (0.001)
Host-country GDP + 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Host-country product tari¤ -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
EU membership +/- -0.006*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.01) (0.007)
Distance to home +/- -0.006*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.01) (0.002)
Real unit labor cost - -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.07***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Home-country product tari¤ - 0.001** 0.008*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Corporate tax - 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.05***
(0.003) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Entry cost - -0.001*** -0.006*** -0.01*** -0.003*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
No. of observations 102,162 26,370 26,370 26,370
Log likelihood -1658.2 -767.5 -903.6 -886.2
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Marginal e¤ects are reported in the table. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry
level are included in the parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for a detailed
description of the variables.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Source Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
Final-good production location AMADEUS 0.007 0.08
Intermediate production location AMADEUS 0.002 0.04
Host-country variables
Host-country GDP WDI 26.24 1.35
Host-country product tari¤ TRAINS 0.04 0.06
EU membership - 0.45 0.49
Distance to home CEPII distance database 7.81 1.19
Real unit labor cost World Bank -2.17 2.17
Home-country product tari¤ TRAINS 0.01 0.02
Corporate tax O¢ ce of Tax Policy Research -1.25 0.29
Entry cost WDI 3.07 1.46
Network variables for nal-good prod.
Horizontal network dummy AMADEUS 0.19 0.39
(a) distance weighted AMADEUS, CEPII 0.09 0.85
(b) tari¤ weighted AMADEUS, TRAINS 0.02 0.23
Vertical network dummy AMADEUS 0.13 0.33
(a) distance weighted AMADEUS, CEPII 1.02 2.78
(b) tari¤ weighted AMADEUS, TRAINS 0.22 0.71
Market potential
(a) distance weighted AMADEUS, CEPII 22.69 0.52
(b) tari¤ weighted AMADEUS, TRAINS 30.11 0.27
Network variables for intermediate prod.
Horizontal network dummy AMADEUS 0.02 0.14
(a) distance weighted AMADEUS, CEPII 0.07 0.63
(b) tari¤ weighted AMADEUS, TRAINS 0.01 0.12
Vertical network dummy AMADEUS 0.19 0.39
(a) distance weighted AMADEUS, CEPII 0.09 0.85
(b) tari¤ weighted AMADEUS, TRAINS 0.02 0.18
Notes: All variables except dependent variables, EU membership, and network dummy variables
are in natural logs.
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Figure 1: Renaults global production network (the darker and lighter areas represent
intermediate and nal-good production locations, respectively)
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Figure 2: The distribution of French MNCs by the number of subsidiary countries
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